The Freedom of a Christian: 
Martin Luther’s Reformation of Law & Liberty

John Witte, Jr.

I.

Martin Luther's *Freedom of a Christian*, published in 1520, was one of the defining documents of the sixteenth-century Protestant Reformation. It remains one of the classic tracts of the Protestant tradition still today. Written on the eve of his excommunication from the Church, this was Luther's last ecumenical gesture toward Rome before making his bombastic exit. Much of the tract was written with a quiet gentility and piety that belied the heated polemics of the day and Luther's own ample perils of body and soul. Luther dedicated the tract to Pope Leo X, adorning it with a robust preface addressed to the "blessed father." He vowed that he had to date "spoken only good and honorable words" concerning Leo, and offered to retract anything that might have betrayed "indiscretion and impiety." "I am the kind of person," Luther wrote in seeming earnest, "who would wish you all good things eternally."

Luther was concerned, however, that the papal office had saddled Leo with a false sense of dignity. "You are a servant of servants" within the Church, Luther wrote to Leo, citing the classic title of the Bishop of Rome. And as a "servant of God for others, and over others, and for the sake of others," you properly enjoy a "sublime dignity" of office. But the "pestilential fellows" of your papal court do not regard you as a humble servant. Instead, they treat you as "a demigod who may command and require whatever you wish." They "pretend that you are lord of the world, allow no one to be considered a Christian unless he accepts your authority, and prate that you have power over heaven, hell and purgatory alike."

Surely, you do not believe any of this, Luther wrote to Leo, tongue near cheek. Surely, you do not believe that you are an infallible interpreter of Scripture" with power above all men and councils. “Perhaps I am being presumptuous" to address you so, Luther wrote presumptuously at the end of his preface. But when a fellow Christian, even a pope, is exposed to
such "dangerous" teachings and trappings, God commands that a fellow brother offer him biblical counsel, without regard for his "dignity or lack of dignity."

In later pages of the *Freedom of a Christian* and in several other tracts published that same crucial year of 1520, Luther took aim at other persons who were, as he put it, "puffed up because of their purported dignity." Luther inveighed at greatest length against the lower clergy, who, as he put it, used the "false power of fabricated sacraments" to "tyrannize the Christian conscience" and to "fleece the sheep" of Christendom. He criticized jurists for spinning the thick tangle of special benefits, privileges, exemptions, and immunities that elevated the clergy above the laity, and inoculated them from legal accountability to local civil magistrates. He was no kinder to lay princes, nobles, and merchants -- those "harpies," as he later called them, "blinded by their arrogance," and trading on their office, pedigree, and wealth to lord it over the languishing commoner. What all these pretentious folks fail to see, Luther wrote, is that "there is no basic difference in status and dignity ... between laymen and priests, princes and bishops, religious and secular." Before God all are equal.

Luther's *Freedom of a Christian* thus became, in effect, his *Dignitatis Humanae* -- his bold new declaration on human nature and human freedom that described all Christians in his world regardless of their "dignity or lack of dignity," as conventionally defined. Pope and prince, noble and pauper, man and woman, slave and free -- all persons in Christendom, Luther declared, share equally in a doubly paradoxical nature.

First, each person is by nature at once a saint and a sinner, righteous and reprobate, saved and lost -- *simul iustus et peccator*, in Luther's signature phrase. Second, each person is by office at once a free lord who is subject to no one, and a dutiful servant who is subject to everyone. Only through these twin paradoxes, Luther insisted, can we "comprehend the lofty dignity of the Christian."

Every Christian "has a two fold nature," Luther argued in developing his first paradox. We are at once body and soul, flesh and spirit, sinner and saint, "outer man and inner man." These "two men in the same man contradict each other" and remain perennially at war. On the one hand, as bodily creatures, we are born in sin and bound by sin. By our carnal natures, we are prone to lust and lasciviousness, evil and egoism, perversion and pathos of untold dimensions. Even the best of persons, even the titans of virtue in the Bible -- Abraham, David, Peter, and Paul -- sin all the time. In and of ourselves, we are totally depraved and deserving of eternal death.
On the other hand, as spiritual creatures, we are reborn in faith and freed from sin. By our spiritual natures, we are prone to love and charity, goodness and sacrifice, virtue and peacefulness. Even the worst of persons, even the reprobate thief nailed on the cross next to Christ's, can be saved from sin. In spite of ourselves, we are totally redeemed and assured of eternal life.

It is through faith and hope in the Word of God, Luther argued, that a person moves from sinner to saint, from bondage to freedom. This was the essence of Luther's doctrine of justification by faith alone. No human work of any sort -- even worship, contemplation, meditation, charity, and other supposed meritorious conduct -- can make a person just and righteous before God. For sin holds the person fast, and perverts his or her every work. "One thing, and only one thing, is necessary for Christian life, righteousness, and freedom," Luther declared. "That one thing is the most holy Word of God, the gospel of Christ." To put one's faith in this Word, to accept its gracious promise of eternal salvation, is to claim one's freedom from sin and from its attendant threat of eternal damnation. And it is to join the communion of saints that begins imperfectly in this life and continues perfectly in the life to come. But a saint by faith remains a sinner by nature, Luther insisted, and the paradox of good and evil within the same person remains until death.

This brought Luther to his second paradox of human nature -- that each Christian is at once a lord who is subject to no one, and a priest who is servant to everyone. On the one hand, Luther argued, "every Christian is by faith so exalted above all things that he is in essence a lord." As a redeemed saint, as an "inner man," a Christian is utterly free in his conscience, utterly free in his innermost being. He is like the greatest king on earth, who is above and beyond the power of everyone. No earthly authority -- whether pope, prince, or parent -- can impose "a single syllable of the law" upon him. No earthly authority can intrude upon the sanctuary of his conscience, can endanger his assurance and comfort of eternal life. This is "the splendid privilege," the "inestimable power and liberty" that every Christian enjoys.

On the other hand, Luther wrote, every Christian is a priest, who freely performs good works in service of his or her neighbor and in glorification of God. "Christ has made it possible for us to be not only his brethren, co-heirs, and fellow-kings, but also his fellow-priests," Luther wrote. And thus, in imitation of Christ, we freely serve our neighbors, offering instruction, charity, prayer, admonition, and sacrifice even to the point of death. We abide by the law of God
so far as we are able so that others may see our good work and be similarly impelled to seek
God's grace. We freely discipline and drive ourselves to do as much as good as we are able, not
so that we may be saved but so that others may be served. "A man does not live for himself
alone," Luther wrote, "he lives only for others." The precise nature of our priestly service to
others depends upon our gifts and upon the vocation in which God calls us to use them. But we
are all to serve freely and fully as God's priests of charity.

Not everyone who is charitable has faith. But everyone who has faith is charitable.
Charity is a form of divine service, of priestly service, whereby God, neighbor, and self are
served at once.

Such are the paradoxes of the Christian life in Luther's view. We are at once sinners and
saints; we are at once lords and servants. We can do nothing good; we can do nothing but good.
We are utterly free; we are everywhere bound. The more a person thinks himself a saint, the
more sinful in fact he becomes. The more a person thinks herself a sinner, the more saintly she
in fact becomes. The more a person acts like a lord, the more he is called to be a servant. The
more a person acts as a servant, the more in fact she has become a lord. This is the paradoxical
nature of human life. And this is the essence of human dignity.

Luther intended his *Freedom of a Christian* to be a universal statement for his world of
Christendom -- a summary of "the whole of the Christian life in a brief form," as he put it in his
preface to Leo. He grounded his views in the Bible, liberally peppering his tract with all manner
of biblical citations and quotations. He wove into his narrative several strong threads of
argument pulled selectively from a number of Church Fathers and late medieval Christian
mystics. He published his tract both in Latin and in simple German, seeking to reach both the
scholar and the commoner alike. He wrote with a pastoral directness and emotional empathy,
convinced that if he could point out the Jekyll and Hyde in everyone, his readers would find both
ample humility and ample comfort. So convinced was Luther of the veracity and cogency of his
views that he believed even the Jews, the one perennial sojourner in his world of Christendom,
would convert *en masse* to the Gospel once they heard it in this simple form.

Though this latter aspiration proved fanciful, Luther's views on human dignity did
command an impressive readership among Christians. *Freedom of a Christian* was a best seller
in its day -- going through twelve printings in its first two years, and five editions by 1524. It
remained a perennial favorite of commentaries and sermons long after Luther's passing, and well
beyond the world of Lutheranism. It is no small commentary on the enduring ecumenical efficacy of Luther's views of human nature, dignity, and freedom that they lie at the heart of the "Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification," signed by Catholic and Evangelical leaders on October 31, 1999.

II.

What all this elegant dialectic theology meant for the nature of political and legal freedom and rule in this world, Luther's little tract did not so clearly say. Luther did make clear that all Christians have the freedom and duty to follow the Bible conscientiously and to speak out against human ideas and institutions that conflict with the Bible. The Bible was for Luther the great equalizer of Christians -- to the remarkable point of allowing Luther, a lowly Augustinian monk from an obscure German town, to address His Holiness Leo X as if he were the pope's equal.

Luther also made clear that clergy and laity are fundamentally equal in dignity and responsibility before God. The traditional assumption that the clergy were superior to the laity, and entitled to all manner of special privileges, immunities, and exemptions was anathema to Luther. Luther's doctrine of the priesthood of all believers at once "laicized" the clergy and "clericized" the laity. He treated the traditional "clerical" office of preaching and teaching as just one other godly vocation alongside many others that a conscientious Christian could properly and freely pursue. He treated all traditional "lay" offices as forms of divine calling and priestly vocation, each providing unique opportunities for service to one's peers. Preachers and teachers in the church must carry their share of civic duties and pay their share of civil taxes just like everyone else. And they should participate in earthly activities such as marriage and family life just like everyone else.

This radical new theory of the clergy and the laity, of the person and society had dramatic implications for church and state, for spiritual life and temporal life. Luther, together with a whole coterie of distinguished theologians, jurists, and moralists drew out these implications as the Reformation unfolded in the first half of the sixteenth century.

The Lutheran Reformation brought fundamental change to German ecclesiastical and spiritual life. It radically resystematized dogma. It truncated the sacraments. It revamped
spiritual symbolism. It vernacularized the Bible and the worship service. It transformed corporate worship and congregational music. It gave new emphasis to the pulpit and the sermon. It expanded catechesis and religious instruction. It truncated clerical privileges and church properties. It dissolved ecclesiastical foundations and endowments. It outlawed pilgrimages and the cult of religious artifacts. It rejected the veneration of non-biblical saints and the cult of the dead. It outlawed the payment of indulgences and mortuaries. It discouraged religious pilgrimages. It reduced the number of holy days. It lightened spiritual rules of diet and dress. It reformed and democratized ecclesiastical discipline and church administration, and much more. All of these changes in spiritual and ecclesiastical life in Lutheran Germany were driven in no small part by Luther’s cardinal call for freedom – freedom of the Christian conscience from unnecessary traditions and rules, freedom of the congregation from clerical monopoly and control, freedom of the Gospel from the intrusions of the Law.

To be sure, some of these spiritual changes built on two centuries of reformist agitation by late medieval humanists, conciliarists, pietists, nominalists, nationalists, and others. And, to be sure, some of the spiritual changes introduced by the Lutheran Reformation had parallels in Catholic reform movements, especially during and after the Council of Trent (1545-1563). But it was especially the Lutheran Reformation that brought these earlier reformist efforts to institutional fruition and expression in Germany. The spiritual changes that the reformers introduced were cast into a unique Evangelical ensemble and transmitted to later generations in scores of thick confessions, catechisms, creeds, and church ordinances.

The Lutheran Reformation also brought fundamental change to German legal and political life direct expression of Luther’s new theology especially his new views of the person and society. For example, Lutheran reformers replaced the traditional understanding of education as a teaching office of the church with a new understanding of the public school as a "civic seminary" for all children, girls and boys alike, to prepare for their distinctive Christian vocations. On that basis, magistrates replaced clerics as the chief rulers of education, civil law replaced canon law as the principal law of education, and the general callings of all Christians replaced the special calling of the clergy as the principal good and goal of education. And the modern public school was born.

Lutheran reformers replaced the traditional idea of marriage as a sacrament with a new idea of the marital household as a social estate which all adults are free to enter - clerical and lay
alike. On that basis, the reformers developed a new civil law of marriage, featuring the freedom of marital contract for all fit parties, freedom to divorce on grounds of adultery, desertion, and other serious faults, freedom to remarry after divorce or death of the other spouse.

Lutheran reformers developed a theory of the essential union of law and equity in the conscience of the Christian judge. On that basis, they developed innovative new theories of practical legal reasoning and pious judicial activism, and advocated the merger of church courts and state courts, of legal procedures and equitable remedies. Lutheran reformers introduced a new theology of the civil, theological, and educational uses of the law. On that basis, they developed arresting new theories of divine law, natural law, and civil law, and an integrated theory of the retributive, deterrent, and rehabilitative functions of law and authority. And there were many more such reforms.

To be sure, some of these legal changes, like some of the spiritual changes introduced by the Lutheran Reformation, had antecedents in late medieval life and analogues in contemporaneous Catholic movements. But, again, it was the Lutheran Reformation that cast this medieval legal inheritance into a unique new legal ensemble in Germany that was preserved in hundreds of legal monographs, consilia, cases, and ordinances crafted by Lutheran jurists and theologians in the first half of the sixteenth century.

Luther's *Freedom of a Christian* also laid some of the foundations for a radical new democratic theory. Luther’s 1520 tract itself was no political manifesto on democratic freedom. Spiritual freedom may well coexist with political bondage, Luther insisted. The spiritual equality of persons and vocations before God does not necessarily entail a social equality with all others. Luther became doubly convinced of this discordance after witnessing the bloody Peasants’ Revolt in Germany in 1525, and the growing numbers of radical egalitarian and antinomian experiments engineered out of his favorite theological doctrines of the priesthood of all believers and justification by faith alone. Indeed in his later life, Luther defended with increasing stridency and belligerence traditional social, economic, political, and ecclesiastical hierarchies as a necessary feature of this earthly life.

While Luther himself resisted drawing out many of the radical political implications of his views on human dignity, equality, and freedom, however, later Protestants did, especially those in the Calvinist tradition. On the one hand, later Protestants argued, every person is created in the image of God and justified by faith in God. Every person is called to a distinct
vocation, which stands equal in dignity and sanctity to all others. Every person is not only a priest and a king, but also a prophet, and responsible to exhort, to minister, and to rule in the community. Every person thus stands equal before God and before his or her neighbor. Every person is vested with a natural liberty to live, to believe, to love and serve God and neighbor. Every person is entitled to the vernacular Scripture, to education, to work in a vocation.

On the other hand, later Protestants argued, every person is sinful and prone to evil and egoism. Every person needs the restraint of the law to deter him from evil, and to drive him to repentance. Every person needs the association of others to exhort, minister, and rule her with law and with love. Every person, therefore, is inherently a communal creature. Every person belongs to a family, a church, a political community.

By the turn of the seventeenth century, Protestant groups began to recast these theological doctrines into democratic norms and forms. Protestant doctrines of the person and society were cast into democratic social forms. Since all persons stand equal before God, they must stand equal before God's political agents in the state. Since God has vested all persons with natural liberties of life and belief, the state must ensure them of similar civil liberties. Since God has called all persons to be prophets, priests, and kings, the state must protect their constitutional freedoms to speak, to preach, and to rule in the community. Since God has created persons as social creatures, the state must promote and protect a plurality of social institutions, particularly the church and the family.

Protestant doctrines of sin were cast into democratic political forms. The political office must be protected against the sinfulness of the political official. Political power, like ecclesiastical power, must be distributed among self-checking executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Officials must be elected to limited terms of office. Laws must be clearly codified, and discretion closely guarded. If officials abuse their office, they must be disobeyed. If they persist in their abuse, they must be removed, even if by revolutionary force and regicide.

These Protestant teachings helped to inaugurate what R.R. Palmer once called the "age of the democratic revolutions." They were among the driving ideological forces behind the revolts of the French Huguenots, Dutch Pietists, and Scottish Presbyterians against their monarchical oppressors in the later sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. They were critical weapons in the arsenal of the revolutionaries in England, America, and even France. They were important
sources of inspiration and instruction during the great age of democratic constitutionalism in later eighteenth and nineteenth century America and Western Europe.

III.

Nearly five centuries after it publication, Luther's *Freedom of a Christian* still gives a distinctive orientation to many contemporary Protestants' instincts about human dignity, human freedom, and human rights.

First, Luther's doctrine that a person is at once sinner and saint renders many Protestants today instinctively skeptical about too optimistic a view of human nature, and too easy a conflation of human dignity and human sanctity. Such views take too little account of the radicality of human sin and the necessity of divine grace. They give too little credibility to the inherent human need for discipline and order, accountability and judgment. They give too little credence to the perennial interplay of the civil, theological, and pedagogical uses of law, to the perpetual demand to balance deterrence, retribution, and reformation in discharging authority within the church, state, home, school and other associations. They give too little insight into the necessity for safeguarding every office of authority from abuse and misuse. A theory of human dignity that fails to take into account the combined depravity and sanctity of the human person is theologically deficient, and politically dangerous.

This cardinal insight into the two-fold nature of humanity was hardly unique to Martin Luther, and is readily amenable to many other formulations. Luther's formula was a crisp Christian distillation of a universal insight about human nature that can be traced to the earliest Greek and Hebrew sources of the West. The gripping tragedies of Homer, Hesiod, and Pindar are nothing if not chronicles of the perennial dialectic of good and evil, virtue and vice, hero and villain in the ancient Greek world. The very first chapters of the Hebrew Bible paint pictures of these same two human natures, now with Yahweh's imprint on them.

The more familiar picture is that of Adam and Eve who were created equally in the image of God, and vested with a natural right and duty to perpetuate life, to cultivate property, to dress and keep the creation. The less familiar picture is that of their first child Cain, who murdered his brother Abel and was called into judgment by God and condemned for his sin. Yet "God put a mark on Cain," Genesis reads, both to protect him in his life, and to show that he remained a child of God despite the enormity of his sin. One message of this ancient Hebrew text is that we
are not only the beloved children of Adam and Eve, who bear the image of God, with all the
divine perquisites, privileges and promises of Paradise. We are also the sinful siblings of Cain,
who bear the mark of God, with its ominous assurance both that we shall be called into divine
judgment for what we have done, and that there is forgiveness even for the gravest of sins we
have committed.

Luther believed that it is only through faith and hope in Christ that a person can
ultimately be assured of divine forgiveness and eternal salvation. He further believed that it was
only through a life of biblical meditation, prayer, worship, charity, and sacramental living that a
person could hold his or her depravity in check and aspire to greater sanctity. I believe that, too,
as do many Christians today. But this is not to say that, in this life, Christians have the only
insights into the two fold nature of humanity, and the only effective means of balancing the
realities of human depravity and the aspirations for human sanctity. Any religious tradition that
takes seriously the Jekyll and Hyde in all of us has its own understanding of ultimate
reconciliation of these two natures, and its own methods of balancing them in this life. And who
are we Christians to say how God will ultimately judge these?

Luther also believed that the ominous assurance of the judgment of God is ultimately a
source of comfort not of fear. The first sinners in the Bible -- Adam, Eve, and Cain -- were
given divine due process: They were confronted with the evidence, asked to defend themselves,
given a chance to repent, spared the ultimate sanction of death, and then assured of a second trial
on the Day of Judgment, with appointed divine counsel. The only time in the New Testament
that God deliberately withheld divine due process, Luther reminds us, was in the capital trial of
His Son -- and, in Christian teachings, that was the only time it was and has been necessary.

The political implications of this are very simple: If God gives due process in judging us,
we should give due process in judging others. If God's tribunals feature at least basic rules of
procedure, evidence, representation, and advocacy, human tribunals should feature at least the
same. The demand for due process is a deep human instinct, and it has driven Protestants over
the centuries, along with many others before and with them, to be strident advocates for
procedural rights.

Second, Luther's doctrine of the lordship and priesthood of all believers renders many
Protestants instinctively jealous about liberty and equality -- but on their own quite distinct
theological terms. In the modern liberal tradition, liberty and equality are generally defended on
grounds of popular sovereignty and inalienable rights. The American Declaration of Independence (1776) proclaimed it a "self-evident truth" "that all men are created equal and are endowed with certain unalienable rights." The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) proclaimed "[t]hat all men are born free and equal in rights and dignity." Protestants can resonate more with the norms of liberty and equality in these documents than with the theories of popular sovereignty and inalienable rights that generally undergird them.

The heart of the Protestant theory of liberty is that we are all lords on this earth. We are utterly free in the sanctuary of our conscience, entirely unencumbered in our relationship with God. We enjoy a sovereign immunity from any human structures and strictures, even those of the church when they seek to impose upon this divine freedom. Such talk of “sovereign immunity” sounds something like modern liberal notions of “popular sovereignty.” And such talk of “lordship” sounds something like the democratic right to “self-rule.” Protestants have thus long found ready allies in liberals and others who advocate liberty of conscience and democratic freedoms on these grounds. But, when theologically pressed, many Protestants will defend liberty of conscience not because of their own popular sovereignty, but because of the absolute sovereignty of God, whose relationship with his children cannot be trespassed. Many Protestants will defend certain unalienable rights, like freedom of conscience, not in the interest of preserving their personal privacy, but in the interest of discharging their divine duties.

The heart of the Protestant theory of equality is that we are all priests before God. The Bible says many times over: "You are a chosen race, a royal priesthood, a holy nation, God's own people." Among you, "[t]here is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus." These and many other biblical passages, which Luther highlighted and glossed repeatedly, have long inspired a reflexive egalitarian impulse in Protestants. All are equal before God. All are priests that must serve their neighbors. All have vocations that count. All have gifts to be included. This common calling of all to be priests transcends differences of culture, economy, gender, and more.

Such teachings have led a few Protestant groups over the centuries to experiment with intensely communitarian states of nature where life is gracious, lovely, and long. Most Protestant groups, however, view life in such states of nature as brutish, nasty, and short, for sin invariably perverts them. Structures and strictures of law and authority are necessary and useful,
most Protestants believe. But such structures need to be as open, egalitarian, and democratic as possible. Hierarchy is a danger to be indulged only so far as necessary.

To be sure, Protestants over the centuries have often defied these founding ideals, and have earnestly partaken of all manner of elitism, chauvinism, racism, antisemitism, tyranny, patriarchy, slavery, apartheid, and more. And they have sometimes engaged in outrageous hypocrisy and casuistry to defend such shameful pathos. But an instinct for egalitarianism -- for embracing all persons equally, for treating all vocations respectfully, for arranging all associations horizontally, for leveling the life of the earthly kingdom so none is obstructed in access to God -- is a Lutheran gene in the theological genetic code of Protestantism.

Third, and finally, Luther's notion that a person is at once free and bound by the law has powerful implications for our modern understanding of human rights. For Luther, the Christian is free in order to follow the commandments of the faith -- or, in more familiar and general modern parlance, a person has rights in order to discharge duties. Freedoms and commandments, rights and duties belong together in Luther's formulation. To speak of one without the other is ultimately destructive. Rights without duties to guide them quickly become claims of self-indulgence. Duties without rights to exercise them quickly become sources of deep guilt.

Protestants have thus long translated the moral duties set out in the Decalogue into reciprocal rights. The First Table of the Decalogue prescribes duties of love that each person owes to God -- to honor God and God's name, to observe the Sabbath day of rest and holy worship, to avoid false gods and false swearing. The Second Table prescribes duties of love that each person owes to neighbors -- to honor one's parents and other authorities, not to kill, not to commit adultery, not to steal, not to bear false witness, not to covet. Church, state, and family alike are responsible for the communication and enforcement of these cardinal moral duties, Protestants have long argued. But it is also the responsibility of each person to ensure that his or her neighbors discharge these moral duties.

This is one important impetus for Protestants to translate duties into rights. A person's duties toward God can be cast as the rights of religion: the right to honor God and God's name, the right to rest and worship on one's Sabbath, the right to be free from false gods and false oaths. Each person's duties towards a neighbor, in turn, can be cast as a neighbor's right to have that duty discharged. One person's duties not to kill, to commit adultery, to steal, or to bear false
witness thus gives rise to another person's rights to life, property, fidelity, and reputation. For a person to insist upon vindication of these latter rights is not necessarily to act out of self-love. It is also to act out of neighborly love. To claim one's own right against a neighbor is in part a charitable act to induce one's neighbor to discharge his or her divinely-ordained duty.

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Some 30 years ago, standing at a lectern similar to this one, the great American jurist Grant Gilmore put what he took as the most enduring legal lesson of Protestantism: "The better the society the less law there will be," Gilmore said. “In Heaven, there will be no law, and the lion will lie down with the lamb. In Hell, there will be nothing but law, and due process will be meticulously observed."

This is a rather common Protestant sentiment, which Luther did much to propound in some of his early writings. But a Protestant, faithful to Luther’s more enduring insights, might properly reach the exact opposite projection. In Heaven, there will be pure law, and thus the lamb will lie down with the lion. In Hell, there will be no law, and thus all will devour each other eternally. Heaven will exalt due process, and each will always receive what's due. Hell will exalt pure caprice, and no one will ever know what's coming.

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