Separation of church and state less pronounced

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The civic catechisms of our day still celebrate Thomas Jefferson's experiment in religious freedom. Religion must be "a concern purely between our God and our consciences," Jefferson wrote in 1802. Politics must be conducted with "a wall of separation between church and state." "Public religion" is a threat to civil society and must thus be discouraged. "Political ministry" is a menace to political integrity and must thus be outlawed.

These Jeffersonian maxims remain for many today the cardinal axioms of a unique American logic of religious freedom to which every patriotic citizen and church must yield. Every public school student learns the virtues of keeping his Bible at home and her prayers in the closet. Every church knows the tax law advantages of high cultural conformity and low political temperature. Religious privatization is the bargain we must strike to attain religious freedom for all. A wall of separation is the barrier we must build to contain religious bigotry for good.

While separation of church and state may now be an article of faith for many, it is no longer a commandment of law.

Separation of church and state was certainly part of American law when many of today's civic opinion-makers were in school. In the landmark cases of Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) and Everson v. Board of Education (1947), the U.S. Supreme Court for the first time used the First Amendment religion clauses to declare local laws unconstitutional. The court also read Jefferson's call for "a wall of separation" into the First Amendment.

In more than 30 cases from 1947 to 1985, the court purged public schools of their traditional religious teachings and cut religious schools from their traditional state patronage. Armed with these precedents, lower courts struck down many other traditional forms and forums of church-state cooperation in the public square.

Wall starts to crumble
After 40 years of such cases, it is no surprise that Jefferson's metaphor of "a wall of separation between church and state" became for many the source and summary of American religious freedom. Indeed, many now think that Jefferson's words are enshrined in the First Amendment itself. It is often disconcerting for readers to discover that the First Amendment is much more restrained and ambiguous: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."

"Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched," Justice Benjamin Cardozo once warned, "for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it." So it has been with the metaphor of a wall of separation. This metaphor has held popular imagination so firmly that many of us have not noticed that separation of church and state is no longer the law of the land.

Over the past two decades, the Supreme Court has abandoned much of its earlier separationism and reversed some of its harshest cases on point. In a dozen cases, the court has upheld government policies that support the public access and activities of religious groups---so long as these groups are voluntarily convened, and so long as nonreligious groups are treated the same way.

Hence, religious counselors could be funded as part of a broader federal family counseling program. Religious student groups could have equal access to public classrooms and state funds that were available to nonreligious student groups. Religious groups could have the same access to public facilities, forums and funds that were already open to other civic groups. Religious schools were just as entitled to participate in a state-sponsored school voucher program as other private schools.

The Supreme Court has defended these holdings on wide-ranging constitutional grounds, and it has not yet settled on a consistent new logic. One common teaching of these recent cases, however, is that public religion must be as free as private religion---not because the religious groups in these cases are really nonreligious. Not because their public activities are really nonsectarian. And not because their public expressions are really part of the cultural mainstream.

To the contrary, these public groups and activities deserve to be free, just because they are religious, just because they engage in sectarian practices and just because they sometimes take their stands above, beyond and against the cultural mainstream. They provide leaven and leverage for the polity to improve.

Contact inevitable

A second teaching of these cases is that the freedom of public religion sometimes requires the support of the state. Today's state is not the distant, quiet sovereign of Jefferson's day, from which separation was both natural and easy. Today's state is an intensely active realm from which complete separation is impossible. Few religious bodies now can avoid contact with the modern welfare state's pervasive regulations of
education, charity, welfare, child care, health care, family, construction, zoning, workplace, taxation and security.

Both confrontation and cooperation with the modern welfare state are almost inevitable for any religion. When a state regulates a particular religion too closely, the free exercise clause provides a pathway to relief. When a state shows too much favor to individual religions, the establishment clause provides a pathway to dissent. But when public religious groups and activities are treated the same as all other eligible recipients, constitutional objections are now rarely availing.

A third teaching of these cases is that freedom of public religion also requires freedom from public religion. Government must strike a balance between coercion and freedom. The state cannot coerce citizens to participate in religious ceremonies and subsidies they find odious. But the state cannot prevent citizens from participation in public ceremonies and programs just because they are religious.

It is one thing to outlaw Christian prayers and Bible readings broadcast at the public school; after all, students are compelled to be there. It is quite another thing to ban moments of silence and private religious speech in these same public schools. It is one thing to bar direct tax support for religious education, quite another thing to bar tax deductions for parents who choose to educate their children in religious schools.

All voices heard

A final teaching of these cases is that freedom of public religion is no longer tantamount to establishment of a common religion. Government support of a common civil religion might have been defensible in earlier times of religious homogeneity. It is no longer defensible in modern times of religious pluralism.

Today, our public religion must thus be a collection of particular religions, not the combination of religious particulars. All religious voices, visions and values must be heard and deliberated in the public square. All peaceable public religious services and activities must be given a chance to come forth and participate.

Some conservative Protestants and Catholics today have seized on this new insight better than most. Their recent rise to prominence in the public square and in the political process should not be met with glib talk of censorship or reflexive incantation of Jefferson's mythical wall of separation.

The rise of the Christian right should be met with the equally strong rise of the Christian left, of the Christian middle, and of sundry Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist and other religious groups who test and contest its premises, prescriptions and policies. That is how a healthy democracy works.
The real challenge of the Christian right is not to the integrity of American politics but to the apathy of American religions. It is a challenge for peoples of all faiths, and of no faiths, to take their place in the marketplace.

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